THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: PUBLIC ADMINIS
TRATION WITHOUT PUBLIC DEBATE
HJEBERT S. MARKS*

N THE midst of noise it is difficult to perceive areas of silence. Since
the appointment of the Atomic Energy Commission in October 1946,
millions of words have been published about the administration of
the Atomic Energy Act.' But the very quantity of material has obscured
the fact that critical analysis and insight have been negligible. Even more
remarkable, the range of issues which has excited any active public debate
has been exceedingly limited despite the many intrinsically controversial
questions with which the Atomic Energy Act is concerned.
Actions of the Atomic Energy Commission that are the subject of press
release are duly reported in the newspapers-but rarely with more penetrating comment or follow up than that which accompanies the society
news. The old argument over military versus civilian control has some
continuing vitality; whether or not the secrets of the atomic bomb are
being securely kept also gets attention; the patent provisions of the law
and their administration are discussed in professional quarters.2 The list
could be extended, but not significantly.
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author.
S6o Stat. 766, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1810 (Supp., 1947). The Act became law August 1, 1946.

The President appointed the five members of the Commission on October 28, 1946. The properties of the Manhattan Engineer District were formally transferred to the Commission by
Executive Order 9816 on December 31, 1946. But it was not until April 9, 1947 that the recess

appointments of Commissioners and General Manager were confirmed.
2 On March iS, 1948 Senator Wherry, majority whip, introduced and spoke in favor of a bill
to return atomic energy to military control. 94 Cong. Rec. 3574 (March 25, 1948).
The most sensational security cases during the past year concerned the revelation that
prior to the appointment of the Commission, two army sergeants personally appropriated
highly secret documents from the Los Alamos reservation. See statement to the Senate of
Senator Hickenlooper, Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on July 7,1947.
93 Cong. Rec. 8664 (July 9, 1947).

On patent matters, see Ooms, Atomic Energy and U.S. Patent Policy, 2 Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, No. 9 and io, at 28, and No. ii and 12, at 30 (946); Miller, The First
Official Report on AEC Patent Problems, 4 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, No. 3, at 77
(1948); Newman and Miller, Patents and Atomic Energy, 12 Law & Contemp. Prob. 746
(1947); American Bar Ass'n, Section of Patent, Trade-Mark and Copyright Law, Committee
reports to be presented at annual meeting September 1947, p. ii; First Report of Atomic
Energy Commission Patent Advisory Panel, Atomic Energy Commission Press Release No.
56, Sept. 21, 1947.
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Of late a handful of informed appraisals have appeared concerning such
matters as the relationship of the Commission's program to business, 3 the

Commission's special problems with respect to loyalty investigations, and
the status of research at Oak Ridge.l3 What is strange, however, is not so
much the infrequency of perceptive commentary: The striking fact is that
neither in depth nor scope is the public discussion which prevails for other
4
government affairs even approximated in the field of atomic energy.
Most recently the Congressional controversy over the reappointment
of the Commissioners might have been expected to stimulate critical review of the broad field of operations of the Atomic Energy Commission.
In fact, however, what has been observed in these legislative proceedings
4
is little more than a series of election year maneuvers. a
The absence of wide debate and criticism concerning the administration
of this far reaching law is a phenomenon unique in the conduct of important public affairs. There are, of course, strong reasons for this peculiar
situation. Some, like the requirements of secrecy, will appear obvious;
others may appear more subtle. The significance of the unusual present
3"Atomic Energy-1948," Business Week, p. 47 (April 1o, 1948).
recently ran an impressive series of articles on the Atomic
3 a The New York Herald Tribune
Energy Commission's loyalty investigations and on general conditions at Oak Ridge. See New
York Herald Tribune, p. i (May i9,1948); pp. 5, 22 (May 20, 1948); p. i8 (May 24, 1948).
On loyalty investigations, see O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 6i Harv. L.
Rev. 592, 598 (1948).
4 See Report of the Chairman of the American Society of Newspaper Editors Standing
Committee on Atomic Energy, Editor and Publisher, p. 22 (April 24, 1948). The New York
Herald Tribune, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Business Week show some signs of
a level of reporting and comment in the field of atomic energy comparable to that which exists
in other areas of public affairs; see New York Post, p. 41 (May 28, 1948): "The Herald Tribune
[is] one of a few U.S. papers which realizes what atomic energy-and atom bombs-mean to
the future of the world. .. ." As examples of high quality reporting and comment on atomic
energy matters see Editorial, A Year of Civilian Control of Atomic Energy, 4 Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists No. 2, at 33 (February, 1948), and "Atomic Energy-948," op. cit. supra
note 3.
4a Under Section 2 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 the terms of the Commissioners first
appointed expire on August 1, 1948. The President on April 20, 1948 renominated the five
members of the Commission for new terms commencing August z, 1948, giving to the chairman, Mr. Lilienthal, a five year appointment, the longest permitted under the system of
staggering prescribed in the Act. The Republican leadership in the Congress countered President Truman's move by proposing bills, S. 2589 and H.R.-64o2, to extend the terms of the five
Commissioners automatically for two years from August 1, 1948, thereby giving to the President elected in November, 1948 power to appoint an entirely new Commission during the next
presidential term. The ground asserted by the Republican leadership for this action was the
necessity of a further period of probation for the "overall evaluation of the atomic energy program and its theory of operation." See S. Rep. 1342, Soth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. Rep.
1973, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948). A minority, led by Democratic Senator McMahon, filed a
report strongly attacking the bills, among other reasons, as a blow to "the spirit of political
non-partisanship in which the entire program was conceived and established" under the
original Act.
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conditions will be clearer, however, if first viewed in the light of the normal
attitude toward public affairs.
I

Throughout the history of this country we have rarely tolerated departure from the principle that the chief protection of society against
incompetence, unfairness, and corruption in government is the unlimited
opportunity for public scrutiny and protest. We have believed also that
this is the chief means of assuring that officials will pursue the course upon
which the public is set. Sixty years ago Lord Bryce observed "a healthy
and watchful public opinion" as a commonplace of the American political
system: "Mischief is checked in America more frequently than anywhere
else by the fear of exposure or by newspaper criticism in the first stage of a
bad scheme." 5 And in a current opinion the United States Supreme Court
quotes Bentham's century-old observation: "Without publicity all other
checks are insufficient; in comparison of publicity all other checks are of
small account.. .. "

In observance of this principle, the physical and social sciences could
find their most important common ground. Science, says a distinguished
physicist, "is not a field in which error awaits death and subsequent generations for verdict-the next issue of the journals will take care of it."7
Perhaps the test of our faith is our firm belief that it is the fatal weakness
of communism and all other forms of totalitarianism that they can find no
substitute for the self-correcting process of open discussion and criticism
which is the democratic tradition.
We pay a high price to maintain this tradition. Ordinarily there is no
need to encourage criticism of large government enterprise; the danger is
rather than it goes too far. The able administrator is harassed and disgusted, the timid administrator is paralyzed, public affairs suffer from
endless delays. Yet even in the conduct of the war agencies, whether
civilian or military, we have insisted upon this principle. On balance we
have always been convinced that the price was not too high. Nevertheless,
in the case of the administration of the Atomic Energy Act critical debate
has been largely absent.
The lack of such discussion by no means signifies an inactive atomic
energy program. We know that the Atomic Energy Commission operates
S 2 Bryce, The American Commonwealth,

321 (2d ed.,

i89i).
i Bentham, Rationale of judicial

6In re Oliver, 68 S. Ct. 499, 5o6 (1948), quoting from
Evidence 524 (1827).
7 Oppenheimer,

No. 3, 65, at 68

Physics in the Contemporary World, 4 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

(1948).
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a capital investment of three billion dollars; that it spends well in excess
of a half billion dollars annually; that it employs 6o,ooo people; that it
has important business relations with hundreds of business concerns and
educational institutions; and that its regulatory activities affect business,
the press, and other private institutions. We profess to know that there
is no activity of government more important than the Atomic Energy
Commission, by which presumably we mean that there is none which now
or potentially affects us so vitally.7a
Nor is it really possible that the absence of debate and criticism is
simply a reflection of the high public respect and confidence which the
present Commission and its staff rightly commands. Our theory and practice are such that it is a matter of indifference whether government officials are able and incorruptible public servants-a David Lilienthal or a
General Groves-or suspected machine politicians.
The public servant, on his part, is rarely aware that the pressures and
attacks from which he suffers during all his official life are frequently a
source of strength and almost always a source of guidance. It is public
pressure which helps weed out incompetent associates when official inertia
would retain them. It is an interested, critical public which often supplies
the only adequate forum for resolving conflicts between executive agencies, between Congress and the Executive, or between government
agencies and special interests. Above all, it is the public reaction to what
he does or fails to do which tells the administrator what is expected of
him. It is his duty to provide leadership, but leadership in the direction of
the public's expectations.
But how can the Atomic Energy Commission be responsive to the impulses and expectations of a society which in relation to this subject matter are not expressed, which seemingly are not even felt? The men who
compose the Atomic Energy Commission have been conscious of the vacuum in which they operate and have sensed the dangers which it portends.
For many months in their reports and speeches, they have made eloquent
pleas to the public to get educated about and take an active interest in
atomic energy.8 Mr Lilienthal has warned that without such "active par7 For a general summarysee address of David E. Lilienthal, The Business Side of the Atom,
before the Chamber of Commerce of Boston, Massachusetts, March i8, 1948 (Atomic Energy
Commission Press Release). As to regulatory activities of the Commission, the agency has
issued regulations governing commerce in the raw materials uranium and thorium (12 Fed.
Reg. x855,March 20, 1947), and regulations governing commerce in facilities for the production
of fissionable materials (12 Fed. Reg. 7657, Nov. IS, 1947); the Commission's "security guidance" service is similar in effect to the government censorship practiced during the war. See
Third Semi-Annual Report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, S. Doc. i8,Soth
Cong. 2d sess. at 27 (1948).
8
E.g., addresses of David E. Lilienthal, Atomic Energy is your Business, before a Community Public Meeting in Crawfordsvile, Indiana, September 22, 1947; Democracy and the
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ticipation in these fateful matters the substance of democracy" is"lost." 9
To these pleas the most common public response appears to be: "What
is it that they want us to know? Why don't they tell us? Then we may
0
know what to do."'1
The pleas have somewhat puzzled the public; the
public response has somewhat puzzled the Atomic Energy Commission.
Meanwhile, the normal interplay of forces between the government and
the governed does not take place. In the field of atomic energy, the process
which has always been our main reliance for a healthy direction of national
effort is virtually nonexistent.
II
Nor have any adequate substitutes for the usual processes of public
criticism been found. The two that are sometimes referred to as assuring
a measure of public accountability, the Congressional Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy and the Commission's public advisory committees,
are certainly of great value, but they alone are clearly insufficient."
We know from its recent reports to the Congress that the Joint Committee, established by the McMahon Act and composed of nine members
of the Senate and nine members of the House, is generally interested in all
activities of the Commission.2 We may assume, too, that it takes a critical attitude toward these activities and that the Commission benefits
from this attitude. 3 But there has been even less public discussion and
Atom, before the American Education Fellowship, Chicago, November 28, 1947; The People,
the Atom and the Press, before the New York State Publishers Association in New York,
January i9, 1948; Atomic Energy-Where Do We Stand Today? before the Radio Executives
Club in New York, February 5, i948; also the address of Sumner Pike, Imperatives in Atomic
Understanding, before the National Education Association in Cincinnati, February 17, 1948,
and addresses of W. W. Waymack, Education in the Atomic Age, before the Institute of Higher
Education in Nashville, Tennessee, July 31, 1947, and Atomic Energy Implications, before
the Illinois Welfare Association in Chicago, November 26, 1947. (Atomic Energy Commission
Press Releases). See also Third Semi-Annual Report of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, op cit. supra note 7,at 26-28.
9 Lilienthal, Democracy and the Atom, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8.
10See, e.g., letter to the editor, What Do the Scientists Wish Us to Know, from L. McDonald, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, p. 16 (Feb. 23, 1948).
11See Lilienthal, The People, the Atom and the Press, op. cit. supra note 8, at i4-16,
and Waymack, Atomic Energy Implications, op. cit. supra note 8, at io. See also Third SemiAnnual Report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, op. cit. supra note 7 at
31-32, 34'1First Report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to the Congress of the United
States, H. Rep. 1289, 8oth Cong. 2d sess. (1948). The Committee was created by Sec. i5(a)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. See also the Reports on S. 2589 and H.R. 6402, Op. Cit.

supra note 4a.
Z "The very fact of the existence of the Joint Congressional Committee is security against
the exercise of arbitrary power by the Commission. While we on the Commission, vested with
a kind of quite terrible responsibility find in it a great reassurance." Lilienthal, The People,
the Atom and the Press, op. cit. supra note 8, at 16.
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comment about the joint Committee and its work than there has been
about the Commission. Fortunately, the membership of the joint Committee of Congress includes some of our most trusted and respected legislators.

4

But just as we rely upon the self-correcting process of public

scrutiny in the case of all agencies of the executive branch, good or bad,
so too we may be apprehensive of an arm of the Congress, however distinguished its members, whose activities are not the subject of public debate. As long as this condition lasts, it must not be assumed that the
Joint Committee will provide an adequate device to assure public accountability in any usual sense. The unreviewed action of eighteen legislators is not likely to be better than the unreviewed action of five administrators. In fact, such a situation could easily lead to an unwholesome
domination of executive action by a small group of legislators which would
not be tolerated if the public were alert and critical.
The Advisory Committees, too, are important in establishing connection between the atomic energy program and the country at large. The
General Advisory Committee created by the McMahon Act, and the
numerous other committees set up by the Commission as authorized by
that law, bring to bear upon the problems of the atomic energy program
the diverse talents of leaders in many phases of American life. 5 But however valuable this form of participation by "outsiders" may be, it is not a
substitute for the kind of public scrutiny to which we have been accustomed. It is indeed as different from what we have relied upon in thepast
as it would be to preserve the principle of jury trial in criminal proceedings
but to permit the trials to be conducted in secret without the presence of
press or public.
14"The present membership of this i8 man permanent Committee is an indication of the
importance Congress itself assigns to it in charting the difficult policy course ahead. Its Chairman is Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, a former Governor of that State, a Member
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, an experienced administrator as well as legislator. Its
Vice Chairman is Representative W. Sterling Cole..., who ... is among the most respected
and influential Members of the House, with long experience in matters of national security.
The Committee includes the Chairman and the ranking Member of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Senators Vandenberg and Connally of Michigan and Texas; it includes
Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut, who as Chairman of the Special Senate Committee
on Atomic Energy in the 7 9 th Congress sponsored the Atomic Energy Act and who follows
with keen interest the international situation on atomic energy control; it includes Senator
Eugene D. Milliken of Colorado, Chairman of the Finance Committee. On the roster of the
Committee are other men of both Chambers most of whose names and reputations are familiar.
... In all, the Committee is unusually broadly representative of the country, both geographically and in its group interests." Lilienthal, The People, the Atom and the Press, op. cit.
supra note 8, at rS.
3sThe
list, membership, and functions of the numerous advisory committees are set forth
in the Third Semi-Annual Report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 31-38. The General Advisory Committee was established by Sec. 2(b) of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The other advisory groups were set up by the commission
pursuant to Sec. 12(a)(i) of the Act. -
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III
Perhaps the requirements of secrecy are such that there can be no public participation in the problems of atomic energy in any customary sense.
As the question is subjected to analysis, however, this answer may appear
less clear. At all events, while secrecy may seriously inhibit debate, that
factor alone hardly accounts for the silence of the interests that are directly affected by the atomic energy program.
Ordinarily the reaction and response of special groups, favorable or
unfavorable, to any particular government action give rise to and sustain
public debate. With limited exceptions, nothing of this sort has happened
in the atomic energy program. In a variety of ways the Commission's
program has an important daily effect upon national life. Procurement of
raw materials, letting of contracts, construction and operation of plants
involving hazardous new industrial processes and hazardous industrial
waste products, administration of regulatory powers-all these activities
and many others in this three billion dollar enterprise are in fact affecting
the public at many points.
These Commission actions fall in areas of public sensitivity which,
judging by the experience of all other government agencies, should produce a vocal response from those groups which are disappointed by Commission decisions. Indeed, some decisions of the Commission occur in the
most sensitive areas of public concern. The effect which Commission
action has upon the press itself is the best example.
Under Section io of the Atomic Energy Act the Commission is given
broad powers to control the dissemination of restricted data. Simply
stated, practically all information relating to atomic energy is classed as
restricted by the Atomic Energy Act. The Commission is authorized to
remove information from this category whenever it concludes that it may
be published without impairing the national security. We need not concern ourselves here with the question which is sometimes raised as to
whether the law is merely an official secrets act or whether it includes
broader censorship powers., 6 The press and the publishing industry have
apparently accepted the principle that whether or not the Act, strictly
construed, applies to unofficial as well as official secrets, they will publish
16See

(i947),

Newman, Control of Information Relating to Atomic Energy, 56 Yale L. J. 769

and Newman and Miller, The Control of Atomic Energy Ch. 10

(1948).

These writers

take the position that the prohibitions on disclosure in Section io apply equally to official
and unofficial information falling within the broadly defined category "restricted data." While
this view may be an accurate statement of the effect which the draftsmen intended, neither the
statute nor the legislative history seem sufficiently explicit on the point to avoid a question of
statutory construction if the issue is ever tested. In that event, it is to be anticipated that questions of constitutionality would also be raised.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

nothing in the face of advice by the Commission that publication would
be prejudicial to the national security.zl In short, for practical purposes,
they seem to have accepted in the field of atomic energy an arrangement
somewhat similar to the one which existed more generally during the war
under the Office of Censorship.
This voluntary restraint on the part of the press and the publishing industry, and their wholehearted cooperation with the government in maintaining security, are deserving of highest praise. But what is surprising is
that there has not even been any open debate concerning the details of
administration. How does it happen that the public bickering between
press and government over the scope and details of censorship so frequently observed in connection with the war agencies does not occur here?'"
Are we then to conclude that the Commission's "security guidance" has
been so satisfactory to the press that there has never been occasion for debate concerning it or public notice of the debate? Considering the diversity and character of the American press, there must be other explanations for the unbroken silence that exists in this area of legitimate discussion.
There are many other areas of activities and many incidents in the
atomic energy program where, despite secrecy, lively concern and comment on the part of the public might be expected but where almost none
has occurred. The Commission's decisions with respect to its Clinton Laboratories is a good illustration.
In May 1947 the Commission publicly announced that the contractor
for the Clinton Laboratories at Oak Ridge would be changed because the
then contractor was unable to manage the laboratory unless it was transferred to a new location remote from Oak Ridge. 9 It was explained in the
release that "the Clinton Laboratories constitute a vital part of the atomic
energy program and certain projects at Clinton are among the most important in this field." "After comprehensive review," it was said, "the
'7 "It was-and is-evident that the public communications media of the Nation desire
overwhelmingly to avoid harm to the national defense and security through publication of
restricted data. There is a heavy continuing demand for security guidance service .... "
Third Semi-Annual Report of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, op. cit. supra

note 7 at 27.

isCompare the immediate reaction to Secretary Forrestal's recent proposal to establish a
voluntary system of censorship in connection with security matters in general. See, e.g.,
Security Consciousness, Editorial, Washington Post, p. 4B (March 28, 1948). The first significant criticism of Commission practice in this connection appeared at the end of May.
See Editorial, Policy in Secret, New York Herald Tribune, p. 22 (May 29, 1948).
'9 Atomic Energy Commission Press Release, Joint Statement of United States Atomic
Energy Commission and Monsanto Chemical Co. at Oak Ridge, Tennessee (May 28, 1947).
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Commission has concluded that in the light of the overall research and
development program in atomic energy, the work of the Clinton Laboratory must continue at Oak Ridge." In September 1947 it was publicly
announced that a new contractor had been selected for the Clinton Laboratories.20 In addition to naming the new contractor, it was announced that
fourteen southern universities and a score of industries and industrial
representatives would participate in the important research, development and training programs at the laboratory. On January i, 1948 the
Commission announced a drastic realignment in the September arrangements for the Clinton Laboratory. 2' Important work conducted at or contemplated for that location would be transferred to Chicago. In addition,
the contractual arrangements originally forecast in the September release were to be fundamentally altered and a third contractor was to
enter the picture. All these changes were duly reported in the Commission's release.
The three public releases of May, September, and January described
major decisions concerning major industrial interests, major university
interests, major geographic interests, major alternatives of national policy. It is not at all clear from the face of the three releases that they are
consistent with one another. Were any other important government
agency to issue three such announcements about one of its main operations, the press and affected interests would immediately engage in a
storm of public discussion. Such discussion would occur if only because
the watchful journalist would discern that on their face the three announcements appear to be contradictory. But such discussion would even
more certainly occur in the case of other agencies because important
decisions and successive changes in them would inevitably disappoint or
at least disturb some of the special interests affected by them. It seems
highly improbable that the Commission, alone among government
agencies, possesses a Solomon-like faculty for always harmonizing and
satisfying all affected interests.
The point of this recital is not to suggest that the Commission's actions
as reflected in these announcements were wrong. The point is that almost
no one among our individualistic, normally critical public was impelled
to debate them openly. No one was impelled to debate them even though
20Atomic Energy Commission Press Release No. 57, Clinton National Laboratory established at Oak Ridge (Sept. 25, 1947).
2 Atomic Energy Commission Press Release No. 8o, Atomic Energy Commission Consolidates Reactor Research and Development -t Argonne, National Laboratory Near Chicago;
Enters New Contract for Clinton National Laboratory at Oak Ridge and Adds Chemical
Engineering Development at that Laboratory (Jan. i, 1948).
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on the face of the releases themselves, without going further for information, there was ample material to excite public discussion. 2 a
IV

Secrecy is certainly the most important factor in accounting for public
inertia in relation to the administration of the Atomic Energy Act. In the
present state of world affairs, the requirements of security altogether
remove from public view certain activities and certain problems of the
Atomic Energy Commission. In addition, there is everywhere an air of
secrecy which seems impenetrable, even when it is not. The mere mechanics of securing a pass into a Commission installation for a routine interview appear formidable, even for the visitor who knows he is entitled
to the pass. The areas of information that are shut off for reasons of security inevitably seem to obscure those which are open. No matter how
much the questioner may be assured that he can understand what he needs
to know without access to what is hidden, he always has a lurking uneasiness that his interpretation of what is in sight will be distorted by what is
unknown.
Much of the subject matter-even that which is completely open-is
technically complex, and therefore hard to understand. It is not only complex, it is totally unfamiliar. One of the Commissioners has suggested
that the subject of atomic energy is less complex than taxation.22 But
when Franklin wrote "Nothing is more certain than death and taxes," he
gave expression to a thought already thousands of years old. The background of ancient familiarity, not to mention suffering, makes it relatively
easy to do in the field of taxation what the Commission urges us to do
here; that is, distill "out of very complex and superficially bewildering
things, relatively simple, quite comprehensible basic issues that the people
are capable of understanding.

'

23

There is, moreover, a general frame of mind which inhibits the active
curiosity without which scrutiny and debate does not take place. A taboolike quality attaches to atomic energy, which is perhaps no more than
another way of saying that the immense proportions of the new physical
force, the seeming magic and real mystery connected with it, its tradition-shaking consequences, and the walls of secrecy and epic drama which
aIt was not until many months after the release of January 1, 1948 that critical public
discussion of the Clinton Laboratories decision began to occur. See "Why Morale Sags at
Oak Ridge," New York Herald Tribune, p. 18 (May 24, 1948).
Waymack, Atomic Energy Implications, op. cit. supra note 8, at 6.
23Ibid.
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surrounded it from the first, make of it a subject from which we instinctively shy away.
Also important in suppressing curiosity is the belief that to ask questions in this' field is unpatriotic. We have come to feel that because it is
wrong to disclose secret information it is somehow wrong and possibly
illegal for the uninitiated to seek information about the subject. Thus, a
Washington taxi driver, on being asked by a fare to go to the Public
Health Building, the Commission headquarters, inquires "That's where
the Atomic Energy Comm... ," and then exclaims, "Oh, I mustn't mention that!"
In addition, large and important sectors of the public and the press seem
to have been restrained from any generally critical scrutiny of the administration of the Atomic Energy Act, perhaps unconsciously, by a sense
of partisanship. These sectors of press and public joined in the fight to
secure enactment of the McMahon Bill.24 Hardly had the bill become law
before another fight took place over the confirmation of the President's
nominees for membership on the Atomic Energy Commission. The same
forces, construing the opposition to the President's nominees as a renewal
of the original effort to defeat the McMahon Bill, again joined to support
the President's appointments. 5 That the Bill was enacted after a notable
unanimity in the vote of the Senate committee which sponsored it, and
that confirmation was voted by overwhelming majorities, were regarded
not as evidence of the weakness of the opposition, but rather of the
strength of the forces that were marshaled in support. Ever since, the
feeling has persisted that at the first opportunity these original opponents
would reassert themselves to destroy the McMahon Act. In these circumstances, the supporters of the Atomic Energy Act and of the President's
nominations to the Commission seem to have assumed that any display
of critical attitude toward the administration of the law would play into
the hands of these opponents.
There may be other factors at work in preventing the free play of the
normal forces of public scrutiny and criticism. Because so many of the
barriers are intangible, it is extremely difficult to assess their relative importance. But secrecy, security, complexity, unfamiliarity, self-restraint
24A

summary of these events can be found in Newman and Miller, The Control of Atomic

Energy, c. i (1948).

2s During the opening remarks of the Senate debate on the confirmation of the Commissioners and the General Manager in March 1947, Senator Hickenlooper, speaking of Mr. Lilienthal, described the very significant and widespread "editorial approval of his appointment of
leading newspaper editors of both major parties from coast to coast." 93 Cong. Rec. 2530
(Mar. 29, 1947).
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-whether occasioned by taboos, suppression of curiosity, or partisanship
-together compose a formidable array. We may hopefully agree with Mr.
Lilienthal that "there is nothing in the nature of atomic energy, nor in the
necessary requirements of secrecy in certain areas of knowledge that prevents the people as a whole from exercising their historic role of judging
what shall be the course of public policy. ' 21 But the people are not now
exercising that historic role and it is plain that if they are to do so very
special exertions will be required of them.
V
The fact that the traditionally powerful forces of public scrutiny and
criticism do not now exist in this field in itself suggests the difficulty in
devising a program to create for the Atomic Energy Commission the public environment of other governmental agencies. A beginning has been
made in the speeches of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission
during past months. The awareness of the problem that they reflect, and
the emphasis they have given in many forums to the need for public interest and education should contribute materially to the creation of a climate favorable for public action.
It will also help if we become conscious of misconceptions that have
interfered with the normal process of scrutiny and criticism. Active curiosity, far from being improper or illegal, is a normal, lawful public responsibility. 7 It has been asserted on behalf of the Commission that "by
' 8
and large the sources of information on public issues are already open.
And it is a fair estimate that the official material made available by and
about the Commission up to the present time compares in quantity and
content with the official material that is made available about other
large government operations in a comparable period of operation.29 Here
12

.6

Lilienthal, Democracy and the Atom, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8.

s Actually, the criminal sanctions of Sec. io(b)( 3 ) of the Atomic Energy Act apply to
attempts to acquire information involving or incorporating "restricted data" only when the
act is done "with intent to injure the United States or with intent to secure an advantage to
any foreign nation." It can hardly be imagined that such intent could be read into any normal
efforts of press and public to secure information about atomic energy. On the other hand, the
provisions relating to disclosure of "restricted data" (Sec. io(b) (2) ) include sanctions when
the person has "reason to believe" that the above consequences will ensue.
Lilienthal, Atomic Energy Is Your Business, op. cit. supra note 8, at ii.
28

9The list includes the following:
a) Commission Reports to Congress: The First Semi-Annual Report of the Commission,
S. Doc. 8, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (i947); the Second Semi-Annual Report of the Commission,
S. Doc. 96, 8oth Cong. ist Sess. (1947); the Third Semi-Annual Report of the Commission,
op. cit. supra note 7.
b) Congressional Hearings: Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for z948. Hearings
on H.R. 3839 before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate,
8oth Cong. ist Sess, at 46 et seq. (1947); Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic
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and there one will see the censor's hand in the official material concerning
the Commission's activities. But such material is mainly distinguished
from the information about other government agencies in that it has not
been illuminated by public reaction.
It takes active curiosity on the part of the press and public to give
meaning to official handouts, no matter how enlightening the government
tries to make them. The official material of other government agencies is
subjected to searching public analysis and questioning which uncovers and
evaluates the reasons behind decisions and the consequences implicit in
them. Because of security restrictions, an effort to subject the available
materials about the Commission to the same treatment would sometimes
be frustrating. Surprisingly often, however, the results would be illuminating.
It should be understood that the general public on the one hand and
the Commission on the other have different responsibilities in respect to
security. It is the duty of the Atomic Energy Commission under the law
to see to it that those things are kept secret which in the interest of national security should be kept secret. It is the duty of the public to cooperate with the Commission in this effort, and this the public has been
doing with remarkable effectiveness." ° But, as the Commission itself has
repeatedly asserted, it is also a public responsibility to find out and to
understand those things which need not be kept secret. This can only be
accomplished through incessant questioning.
Energy on labor relations at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948); Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on
First Deficiency Appropriations Bill, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 86i et seq. (1948); Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, on the
Supplemental Independent Offices Appropriation Bill for 1949, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 747
et seq. (1948); see also H.R. Rep. 589, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess., at 8 (i947); H.R. Rep. 2245, Soth
Cong. 2d Sess., at 2 (948); H.R. Rep. i618, Soth Cong. 2d Sess., at 2 (1948).
c) A large number of reports and documents released by the Commission, including 1700
individual declassified documents made available to the public through the Office of Technical
Services of the Department of Commerce; over seventy-five statements for press and public
giving facts of new developments; reprints of public speeches made by members of the Commission; and reports of advisory boards of the Commission, namely, Report of the Medical
Board of Review, June 20, 1947, and the Report of the Patent Advisory Panel, September 17,
1947. See Third Semi-Annual Report of the Commission op. cit. supra note 7, at 24-28 for a

description of material.
d) Reports of Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, op. cit. supra note 12.
30 Public compliance with the Atomic Energy Act has been so effective that thus far there
has been no test of the extremely difficult evidentiary questions which would arise in any
prosecution for unlawful disclosure of secret information. See Haydock, Some Evidentiary
Problems Posed by Atomic Energy Security Requirements, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 468 (1948);
Secret Documents in Criminal Prosecutions, 47 Col. L. Rev. 1356 (1947). However, there
have been a number of unreported convictions under Sections 47 and 128 of the Criminal Code
(i8 U.S.C.A. §§ 100, 234), including one in which such questions were involved. United States
v. Paporello (D.C. N.M., 1948).
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The Atomic Energy Commission is no more omniscient than any other
Government agency in its capacity to determine precisely what information within its vast area of nonsecret knowledge the public needs to
know. It is the duty of a democratic public to direct to its government
every question that its curiosity provokes. It is the Atomic Energy Commission which.must bear the responsibility of deciding whether an answer
to any particular question may prejudice the national security.
Once this relationship is clearly defined, it will be possible for the public
to begin to develop insights about the atomic energy program. Such insights can come about only through a constant interchange between the
government and the people. The questions raised in Congressional hearings, in Congressional debates, in news stories and editorials, the questions raised by all manner of special interests-these and the government's answers to them, and the futher questions thereby suggested, can
produce a broad and endless process, through which understanding will
evolve and influence will exert itself.
This process is especially necessary if the public is to overcome the
difficulties growing out of the complexity and unfamiliarity of the subject
matter. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the Baruch proposals on
international control of atomic energy were understood clearly enough in
the course of the extensive discussion that they provoked. In comparison,
the official material which has been published about the Atomic Energy
Commission seems less complex. Once the same process of scrutiny,
questioning, and discussion which illuminated the proposals on international control is brought to bear upon the available information in the
domestic field a comparable measure of understanding can result.
Not only is it essential that there be an active curiosity about the atomic energy program-a curiosity which expresses itself in incessant questioning-there must also be a willingness to criticize. Partisanship that
exercises a restraint upon legitimate criticism out of a fear that such criticism will aid the enemies of the McMahon Act defeats its own purposes.
The sectors of the press and public which thus refrain from critical comment are the very groups which by virtue of their participation in the
fight on the McMahon Bill and on confirmation acquired an informed
background on atomic energy. In refraining from criticism, these groups
have no doubt spared the Commission a considerable amount of annoyance. But they have deprived the administration of the Atomic Energy
Act of a much more important source of strength-the strength that comes
from constructive exposure of weakness and error and the opportunity
thereby created for correction.
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In any effort to quicken the forces of public scrutiny and criticism,
account must be taken of the attitude of public officials toward these
forces, and particularly toward the quest for information which these
forces stimulate. The usual but never tolerable condition of a government
official is one of continual harassment by a seemingly specious, unfair and
unsympathetic press and public. That this condition makes officials wary
and that it often makes the process of getting information from a public
agency difficult is not surprising. The fear of embarrassment which the
official or his agency may suffer as a result of disclosing information can be
a more important factor in deciding whether or not to answer a question
than the public need for an answer.
These considerations are as relevant to atomic energy as to any other
subject. The staff of the Commission will be conscious that what they
say may be used to discredit them, in ways that are frequently unfair and
always painful. The members of the Atomic Energy Commission have
urged earnestly and often that the public take a critical interest in their
work. It should not be thought, however, that the express recognition by
the Commissioners and their staff of the need for scrutiny will make the
path of the questioner and potential critic easier than it would be with
any other public agency. A party in power may assert that a strong opposition is essential to democracy; but it cannot be expected willingly
to supply what might be used as ammunition by its opponents.
In the case of the Atomic Energy Commission, there is, moreover, a
special hazard to the process of debate and criticism. The line between
what must be secret and what can be open is not a sharp one. When areas
of information involving possible embarrassment are probed, the temptation must always be present to draw the line so that embarrassment will
be avoided rather than to draw the line only where the reasonable requirements of security dictate. The danger is not that the Atomic Energy
Commission or its staff would thus act deliberately. The danger is rather
of unconsciously confusing the needs of security with the desire for selfprotection from critical comment. 3' During the war, journalists developed
a sixth sense which enabled the press to tell whether the Government's
releases and its response to questions were really as full and frank as
security would permit. This experience may ultimately be repeated in the
field of atomic energy. But it will not be repeated as long as it continues
to be possible to say that "only about a dozen newspaper reporters in the
31 The Washington Post recently referred to "past military efforts to cover up mistakes
under the guise of security and the tendency of some officers to classify virtually every thing
controversial as 'top secret.'" Op. cit. supra note 18. It is certainly open to question whether
the military is any more subject to this temptation than the civilian administrator.
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United States are equipped to write about atomic information accurately
and with understanding.32

The absence of public scrutiny and criticism which the Atomic Energy
.Commission has so far experienced will not last indefinitely. The deep
and powerful forces which have made our public alert and vocal in other
public affairs will sooner or later assert themselves in this field. The
question is not whether this will happen but when and in what form. If
too long delayed, our atomic energy program will almost certainly grow
so far out of touch with the American environment that when the forces
of criticism finally begin to operate with their customary vigor they will
produce drastic upheavals. Deprived of the continuous, corrective effects
of public scrutiny, the atomic energy program will have developed so much
that is weak and unsound that the public wrath which then seeks drastic
change will be justified. By then the administration that is thus destroyed
may not be worth saving. If this should happen, not only will the continuity essential to the success of the undertaking be destroyed, but the public, without the knowledge gained by prior participation in the problems
of atomic energy, will not be in a position to insure the establishment of
a sound administration in its place.
Any practical measures that may be proposed now for releasing the
normal forces of critical scrutiny and debate will seem modest as compared with the proportions of the problem. What is important, however,
is that the process commence. The best hope for constructive change lies
in recognition of the fact that once started this process which is so close to
our most basic traditions will find its own strength and its own new
channels for growth.
v Report of the Chairman of the American Society of Newspaper Editors Standing Committee on Atomic Energy, Editor and Publisher, 22 (April 24, 1948).

